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A commentary on
Multiple tasks and neuroimaging
modalities increase the likelihood of
detecting covert awareness in patients
with disorders of consciousness
by Gibson, R. M., Fernández-Espejo,
D., Gonzalez-Lara, L. E., Kwan, B.
Y., Lee, D. H., Owen, A. M., et al.
(2014). Front. Hum. Neurosci. 8:950. doi:
10.3389/fnhum.2014.00950
In the Journal, Gibson et al. (2014) report
the validation of the use of two functional
brain imaging techniques to complete the
bedside clinical examinations for the diag-
nosis of and communication with patients
suffering from disorders of consciousness
like vegetative state (VS) or minimally
conscious state (MCS). Research in neu-
roimaging has become a booming sector
in recent years. Experimental approaches,
investigating consciousness hierarchically,
from a low to the highest level of cogni-
tion, and usingmethods such as functional
Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) or
ElectroEncephaloGraphy (EEG), already
bring some early promising results, which
have been highly publicized through the
media, and thence, have undoubtedly
aroused a tremendous hope in the fami-
lies of people with VS or MCS. Medical
teams in charge of developing new imaging
tests have faced strong demand from fam-
ilies to apply these new tests, even if these
ones were, in all likelihood, not yet com-
pletely reliable and not validated, and in
spite of the fact that the ethical and social
consequences were not yet fully drawn.
There is a lack of objective mea-
sures to index consciousness, as pointed
out again recently by Paller and Suzuki
(2014). Clinical behavioral assessment is
still the gold standard and clinical studies
evaluating the diagnosis performance of
neuroimaging often require a control
group composed of conscious healthy
subjects. Nevertheless, our team (Gabriel
et al., 2015) as Owen’s team (Fernandez-
Espejo et al., 2014) did not achieve a
sensitivity of 100% for the fMRI mental
imagery tasks performed on healthy vol-
unteers. Furthermore, in most protocols,
both data analysis and data interpretation
are complex, ambiguous, must be taken
warily, and are the subject of a much
debated scientific question (Dyer, 2013;
Goldfine et al., 2013). In some fMRI pro-
tocols, 41% of the subjects weren’t able
to be assessed, mainly because of spon-
taneous movement necessitating sedation
before MRI (Stender et al., 2014). Works
carried out with EEG, more easily afford-
able at bedside, have shown some limita-
tions too (Cruse et al., 2011; Höller et al.,
2013; Henriques et al., 2014). Cruse et al.
(2011) noticed that 3 out of 12 healthy
subjects (i.e., 25%) were unable to perform
the EEG mental imagery task. According
to these authors (p. 6): “Some healthy
individuals might be unable to produce
reliable classification, even with feedback
training (so-called brain-computer inter-
face illiterates).” In fact, this rather proves
that the paradigm and/or the processing
of results used are currently not accurate
enough to be observed in all conscious
subjects. Moreover, the replication of the
samemental imagery protocol pointed out
that, after correcting the experimental and
statistical biases of the original study, it was
impossible to observe any reliable brain
activity in a group of 20 healthy volunteers
(Henriques et al., 2014).
For these critics, a problem of a semi-
ological nature arises, which is to know
how to be able to assert whether or not
the signs in response to a given request
might be stated as specific of either a pres-
ence of consciousness or an absence of
consciousness.
Whatever the brain activity obtained
in response to experimental paradigms it
remains extremely difficult to draw con-
clusions from it. As a consequence the
announcement of findings is still very
tricky.
The supporters of neuroimaging argue
that any oriented signal is better than
nothing, and constitutes a proof of an
ability to be conscious. Nevertheless, the
impact of false positive and false negative
results is too significant to be neglected
without a validation stage in order to
understand exactly the meaning of the
presence or the absence of an expected
signal.
Instead of discard clinical signs or to be
afraid of relatives’ reaction in front of neu-
roimaging results, could we re-introduce
the feelings of the close relatives and/or the
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medical team, regarding a potentially ori-
ented reaction from the tested VS-patient
to seek some innovative paradigms to
assess the processes of consciousness by
neuroimagery?
Actually, in all likelihood, it seems that
the paradigms used in neuroimaging are
still not adapted to the peculiar condition
in which VS-patients and MCS-patients
find themselves. Especially, it is quite pos-
sible that using standardized stimuli as
beeps (Faugeras et al., 2012), or using
some instructions which are nowhere
near to be compatible with the subject’s
own real-life experiences (for instance,
ask him/her to imagine himself/herself
playing tennis, even if that has never
been the case), may not induce any sig-
nificant cortical or subcortical response
from this patient, as those actions seem
to be too distant from his former daily
life. Some authors attempted the devel-
opment of familiarity stimuli. Previous
works with experienced volunteers seemed
to enhance single-trial detectability of
imagined movements when they imag-
ine actions involving the sport or instru-
ment with which they have experience.
Nevertheless, Gibson and colleagues found
no positive results for any patient in the
familiar imagery task.
Perhaps we need to go further with the
use of a personalized paradigm in neu-
roimaging for patients in VS or MCS, tak-
ing into account both their own real-life
experiences and the subjective feeling of
their close relatives of a kind of “pres-
ence.” Interviews of relatives or caregivers
of people in VS orMCS have clearly shown
the existence of some specific “signs” of
a sensory nature, like some behavioral
or emotional reactions, in response to a
given surname, the voice of someone, a spe-
cific smell, music, hugs, etc. which are
as many specific hints about the feeling
of a kind of “presence,” or even a kind
of consciousness. Very often these specific
“signs” are not clinically reproducible and
seem to be distorted by affection, close-
ness, and subjectivity of relatives to main-
tain hope. Nevertheless patient in VS or
MCS could have infraclinical reactions to
these types of stimuli with oriented brain
activity detectable by EEG and/or fMRI.
The challenge for researchers is to
transform the feelings into reproducible
stimuli. The choice of stimuli used will
be obtained through individual interviews,
done upstream with the families and the
medical teams which take care of the
patients in VS or in MCS. Some exam-
ples from close relatives of patients diag-
nosed with VS reflect this observation
of “personalized” signs of consciousness
related to the perception of emotions (“I
really get the impression that he reacts
when he smells the aroma of pancakes”),
to familiarity (“I have the feeling that he
recognizes the sound of my voice” or,
“. . .when listening to a CD featuring her
children’s voices, she shed some tears” or
“I believe he has a reaction when he is
listening to his favorite music”), or even
to the patient’s self-awareness (“I have
the impression that he reacts to his first
name”). In the last 10 years, a large num-
ber of studies have explored the reac-
tions of patients to different types of
stimuli. Emotional, linguistic, or familiar
stimuli are now frequently used to assess
consciousness. However, this approach is
usually systematic in the sense that the
consciousness of all VS patients is explored
with the same stimuli, without having
gathered information from relatives or
health professionals about their percep-
tion of potential patient’s clinical reac-
tions. Here, we suggest adapting the task
to “signs” specific to each patient. For
instance, a custom protocol corresponding
to the statement: “I have the impression
that he/she reacts to his/her first name”
could replicate those used in healthy sub-
jects (Holeckova et al., 2006) or in patients
with disorders of consciousness (Perrin
et al., 2006). Such a design is easily adapt-
able to other types of stimuli or sensory
modalities.
Thanks to the results of this “personal-
ized” paradigm, merged with those issued
from “standardized” procedures, we hope
to be able to remove at least partially the
doubts and the suffering of close relatives
of the patients in VS or MCS. The uncer-
tainty of that feeling of presence affects
what should be undertaken by the medi-
cal profession: either increase daily sensory
stimuli or prepare the close relatives to a
“grieving process.” This questioning is at
the heart of key ethical issues.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
We thank Thierry Smer for his help in
translation.
REFERENCES
Cruse, D., Chennu, S., Chatelle, C., Bekinschtein, T.
A., Fernández-Espejo, D., Pickard, J. D., et al.
(2011). Bedside detection of awareness in the vege-
tative state: a cohort study. Lancet 378, 2088–2094.
doi: 10.1016/S0140-6736(11)61224-5
Dyer, C. (2013). Researchers challenge find-
ings of team that showed awareness in three
patients in vegetative state. BMJ 346:f719. doi:
10.1136/bmj.f719
Faugeras, F., Rohaut, B., Weiss, N., Bekinschtein,
T., Galanaud, D., Puybasset, L., et al. (2012).
Event-related potentials elicited by violations of
auditory regularities in patients with impaired
consciousness. Neuropsychologia 50, 403–418. doi:
10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2011.12.015
Fernandez-Espejo, D., Norton, L., and Owen, A. M.
(2014). The clinical utility of fMRI for identifying
covert awareness in the vegetative state: a compar-
ison of sensitivity between 3T and 1.5T. PLoS ONE
9:e95082. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0095082
Gabriel, D., Henriques, J., Comte, A., Grygoryeva,
L., Ortega, J. P., Cretin, E., et al. (2015).
Substitute or complement? Defining the rela-
tive place of EEG and fMRI in the detection
of voluntary brain reactions. Neuroscience. doi:
10.1016/j.neuroscience.2015.01.053. [Epub ahead
of print]
Gibson, R. M., Fernández-Espejo, D., Gonzalez-Lara,
L. E., Kwan, B. Y., Lee, D. H., Owen, A. M.,
et al. (2014). Multiple tasks and neuroimaging
modalities increase the likelihood of detecting
covert awareness in patients with disorders of
consciousness. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 8:950. doi:
10.3389/fnhum.2014.00950
Goldfine, A. M., Bardin, J. C., Noirhomme, Q., Fins, J.
J., Schiff, N. D., and Victor, J. D. (2013). Reanalysis
of “bedside detection of awareness in the vegetative
state: a cohort study.” Lancet Neurol. 381, 289–291.
doi: 10.1016/S0140-6736(13)60125-7
Henriques, J., Gabriel, D., Grigoryeva, L., Haffen, E.,
Moulin, T., Aubry, R., et al. (2014). Protocol design
challenges in the detection of awareness in aware
subjects using EEG signals. Clin. EEG Neurosci.
doi: 10.1177/1550059414560397. [Epub ahead of
print]
Holeckova, I., Fischer, C., Giard, M. H., Delpuech,
C., and Morlet, D. (2006). Brain responses
to a subject’s own name uttered by a famil-
iar voice. Brain Res. 1082, 142–152. doi:
10.1016/j.brainres.2006.01.089
Höller, Y., Bergmann, J., Thomschewski, A.,
Kronbichler, M., Höller, P., Crone, J. S., et al.
(2013). Comparison of EEG-features and classifi-
cation methods for motor imagery in patients with
disorders of consciousness. PLoS ONE 8:e80479.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0080479
Paller, K. A., and Suzuki, S. (2014). The source of
consciousness.Trends Cogn. Sci. 18, 387–389. doi:
10.1016/j.tics.2014.05.012
Perrin, F., Schnakers, C., Schabus, M., Degueldre,
C., Goldman, S., Bredart, S., et al. (2006).
Brain response to one’s own name in vegeta-
tive state, minimally conscious state, and locked-
in syndrome. Arch. Neurol. 63, 562–569. doi:
10.1001/archneur.63.4.562
Stender, J., Gosseries, O., Bruno, M. A., Charland-
Verville, V., Vanhaudenhuyse, A., Demertzi,
A., et al. (2014). Diagnostic precision of PET
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org February 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 78 | 2
Pazart et al. Disorders of consciousness, a place for clinical feeling?
imaging and functional MRI in disorders of
consciousness: a clinical validation study. Lancet
384, 514–522. doi: 10.1016/S0140-6736(14)
60042-8
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare
that the research was conducted in the absence of any
commercial or financial relationships that could be
construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Received: 20 December 2014; accepted: 31 January 2015;
published online: 17 February 2015.
Citation: Pazart L, Gabriel D, Cretin E and Aubry R
(2015) Neuroimaging for detecting covert awareness in
patients with disorders of consciousness: reinforce the
place of clinical feeling! Front. Hum. Neurosci. 9:78. doi:
10.3389/fnhum.2015.00078
This article was submitted to the journal Frontiers in
Human Neuroscience.
Copyright © 2015 Pazart, Gabriel, Cretin and Aubry.
This is an open-access article distributed under the terms
of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY).
The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums
is permitted, provided the original author(s) or licen-
sor are credited and that the original publication in
this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted aca-
demic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is
permitted which does not comply with these terms.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org February 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 78 | 3
